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Abstract Presupposition is the semantic-pragmatic phenomenon whereby a
statement contains an implicit precondition that must be taken for granted (pre-
supposed) for that statement to be felicitous. This article discusses the role of
presupposition in legislative texts, using examples from Swiss constitutional and
administrative law. It illustrates (a) how presuppositions are triggered in these texts
and (b) what functions they come to serve, placing special emphasis on their con-
stitutive power. It also demonstrates (c) how legislative drafters can distinguish
between ‘‘good’’ presuppositions and ‘‘bad’’ presuppositions by weighing their main
advantage, conciseness, against their main flaw, reduced transparency. The present
study argues that, if employed carefully, presuppositions can be a useful stylistic
means to keep legislative texts free from unnecessary clutter that merely elaborates
on the obvious; however, it also suggests that, if applied wrongly, presuppositions
can camouflage the duties and obligations placed on the subjects of a law and thus
impede its accessibility and its efficient and effective implementation.
Keywords Presupposition  Language and law  Legislative drafting 
Constitutional law  Administrative law
1 Introduction
The king of France is bald.
Ever since Russell [21] and Strawson [28] discussed this sentence in their
respective essays on denotation, it has become the classic example of a statement
that includes a presupposition. The argument goes that, explicitly, the sentence
asserts that the king of France is bald and, implicitly, it presupposes that there is a
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king of France in the first place. The sentence thus serves to illustrate the general
nature of presuppositions as preconditions that are implicitly taken for granted by
certain linguistic expressions (or rather by the speakers uttering them). The
phenomenon of presupposition has been studied extensively from the perspectives
of formal semantics, pragmatics and the philosophy of language [2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12,
22, 25–27, 29].
Recently, presupposition, among other types of implicit content, has also begun
to be investigated in the philosophy of law: Marmor [15–17] argues that in
legislative texts, presuppositions1 form part of ‘‘what the law prescribes’’, that is,
that the legislator commits himself to the contents implied by presuppositions and
that these contents thus have the status of legal provisions:
Semantically encoded implications and/or presuppositions are relevant in the
legal context just as they are in ordinary conversation. Communicative
commitments that derive from the meaning of the expression used are
normally part of what the law prescribes, even if the implicated content is not
entirely specified by the meaning of the legal utterance. [16, p. 451]
The aim of the present study is to link this theoretical insight to the practice of
legislative drafting, using examples from Swiss constitutional and administrative
law.2 In particular, I will (a) identify some of the most common and consequential
presupposition triggers in legislative texts, (b) describe the functions that the
respective presuppositions serve in these texts, and (c) reflect on the phenomenon
from the perspective of legislative drafting, i.e. ask how legislative drafters can
distinguish between ‘‘good’’ presuppositions and ‘‘bad’’ presuppositions. The
approach I take in this study is thus primarily descriptive (a, b), but it is
complemented with considerations of a more prescriptive nature, viz. questions
relating to principles of good practice in legislative drafting (c).
The paper is organised as follows. I will begin by giving a brief overview of the
linguistic properties that are commonly said to define presuppositions (Sect. 2). I
will then analyse a number of linguistic constructions that trigger presuppositions in
legislative texts, and discuss the functions they fulfil in the particular context of
constitutional and administrative law (Sect. 3). On the basis of these observations, I
will finally propose a number of criteria for how legislative drafters can distinguish
between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ presuppositions in legislative texts (Sect. 4).
2 Definitions
The literature differentiates between the notion of semantic (or conventional)
presuppositions, which are elicited by specific linguistic expressions, and a broader
1 Marmor [15, 16, 17] refers to the respective set of phenomena as ‘‘semantically implied content’’ or
‘‘semantically encoded implication/semantically encoded presupposition’’.
2 Swiss federal law is drafted in German and in French and then translated into Italian. Once published,
all three language versions are considered equally authentic [14]. In this paper, I will specifically look at
examples from German-language texts. For each example, I will provide the authentic German wording
as well as a translation into English.
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conception of pragmatic (or conversational) presuppositions, which include a wide
range of general background knowledge activated and alluded to in communicative
interactions [3, 13, 25]. In this paper, I use the term ‘‘presupposition’’ in the former
sense, i.e. to refer to presuppositions elicited by the conventional semantics of
specific linguistic expressions. However, this only concerns the extension of the
phenomenon; I remain impartial with regard to the hotly debated question of
whether, from the perspective of linguistic theory, such presuppositions are best
explained as a property of semantics [5, 25, 28] or as a product of pragmatics [1, 11,
23, 27, 32].3
If conceived in the aforementioned way, presuppositions are usually defined by a
set of prototypical linguistic properties that distinguish them from at least two other
types of implicit content: entailments and conversational implicatures. In brief,
(a) presuppositions are preconditions that must be taken for granted for a statement
to be felicitous, (b) entailments are facts that logically follow from a statement, and
(c) conversational implicatures are conclusions at which the hearer arrives on the
basis of the assumption that the speaker is cooperative and follows the usual
conversational maxims [7].
The following example illustrates these three types of implicit content:
(1) Joe has stopped working on Sundays.
a. Joe used to work on Sundays. (presupposition)
b. Joe does not work on Sundays anymore. (entailment)
c. Joe has not given up working completely. (convers. implicature)
For the statement that Joe has stopped working on Sundays to make sense, one has
to take for granted that Joe used to work on Sundays: (1) presupposes (1-a). In
contrast, the fact that Joe does no longer work on Sundays is not a precondition but
rather a logical consequence of Joe having stopped working on Sundays: (1) entails
(1-b). Finally, the conversational maxim of quantity (‘‘Make your contribution as
informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange’’) may, in a
specific situation, lead the hearer to assume that the speaker would have said so if
Joe had not only stopped working on Sundays but had given up working completely;
the hearer may thus infer that Joe has in fact not given up working completely. In
such a conversational scenario, uttering (1) implicates (1-c).
Several heuristics have been suggested to determine whether some implicit
content is a presupposition or rather an entailment or a conversational implicature.
These heuristics test the behaviour of the respective content in specific linguistic
environments. Presuppositions, for instance, are typically preserved (‘‘projected’’)
under negation and in similar forms of embedding, whereas entailments are not. The
following modifications of sentence (1) therefore still presuppose (1-a), but they no
longer entail (1-b):4
3 Proponents of the latter mostly argue that presuppositions represent a form of implicature.
4 Beaver and Guerts point out that ‘‘[i]t makes sense to try several such embeddings when testing for
presupposition, because it is not always clear how to apply a given embedding diagnostic. Thus, for
example, […] although it is widely agreed that too is a presupposition-inducing expression, the negation
test is awkward to apply in this case’’ [3, p. 2435].
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(2) a. Joe has not stopped working on Sundays. (negation)
b. If Joe has stopped working on Sundays, Sue will be happy. (condition)
c. Has Joe stopped working on Sundays? (question)
d. Maybe Joe has stopped working on Sundays. (modality)
e. Sue believes that Joe has stopped working on Sundays. (belief)
Projection from embedding also distinguishes presuppositions from conversational
implicatures: the statements in (2) provide too weak a basis for the hearer to safely
infer (1-c) by means of conversational maxims. However, conversational implicat-
ures differ more clearly in yet another way: they can be cancelled, while
presuppositions (and entailments) typically cannot. This property can be tested by
combining the original statement with the negation of the implicit content in
question, as illustrated in (3). In most cases, the result is contradictory for
presuppositions and entailments, as seen in (3-a) and (3-b) respectively, but
acceptable for conversational implicatures, as seen in (3-c):
(3) a. #Joe has stopped working on Sundays; he had not worked on Sundays.
b. #Joe has stopped working on Sundays; he still works on Sundays.
c. Joe has stopped working on Sundays; in fact, he has given up working
completely.
Presuppositions are typically elicited by the semantics of specific linguistic
constructions, so-called presupposition triggers. Among the most commonly cited
classes of presupposition triggers are definite descriptions (e.g. The king of France
presupposes There is a king of France), proper names (Jimmy Carter is going to
give a speech presupposes There is an individual by the name of Jimmy Carter),
factive verbs (Nancy knows that it takes 8 h to get to Rome presupposes It takes 8 h
to get to Rome), aspectual verbs (Joe has stopped working on Sundays presupposes
Joe used to work on Sundays), implicative verbs (Luke failed to solve the puzzle
presupposes Luke tried to solve the puzzle), manner adverbs (The tortoise overtook
the hare slowly presupposes The tortoise overtook the hare), iteration adverbs
(Anthony did it again presupposes Anthony had done it before), cleft sentences (It
was the president who decided the matter presupposes Someone decided the matter)
and temporal clauses (After the company went bankrupt, all employees were made
redundant presupposes The company went bankrupt).
The classical triggers listed above were mostly collected from narrative
discourse; not all of them also play a role in legislative texts. Conversely, certain
presupposition triggers that have been considered only fleetingly can be shown to be
rather important in the context of statutes and regulations.
3 Analysis
Presuppositions touch on two conflicting principles of legislative drafting:
conciseness and transparency. On the one hand, presuppositions provide a means
to ‘‘pack’’ extra content into a single linguistic expression, thus allowing for shorter
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texts. On the other hand, the implicit content transported by a presupposition may
remain hidden behind the content asserted explicitly and thus be hard to find. In the
worst case, using presuppositions may amount to what Rosenbaum in his legislative
drafting guide calls applying a trick: ‘‘If you can do things in a clever way or a
simple but somewhat longer way, choose the simple way. Don’t be too tricky—you
may end up tricking yourself or the next person who comes to amend the law’’ [20,
p. 9]. Legislative drafters will have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether in a
specific context the advantage of using a presupposition, conciseness, prevails over
its main disadvantage, lack of transparency.
In order to get an idea of the criteria according to which such a decision can be
made, I will introduce a selection of linguistic constructions that frequently serve as
presupposition triggers. I will look at specific examples from Swiss constitutional
and administrative law and analyse the effects they have in the contexts in which
they appear. The analysis of each construction will be concluded with a brief
discussion of the respective examples from the perspective of legislative drafting.
3.1 Definite Descriptions
Definite descriptions are arguably the most frequent presupposition triggers in
legislative texts. For the present purpose, they can be classified into two categories:
(a) definite descriptions denoting entities that predate the law or rather exist
independently of it and (b) definite descriptions denoting entities that only come
into being by virtue of the law. This distinction is similar to Searle’s distinction
between ‘‘brute facts’’ and ‘‘institutional facts’’, the former relating to ‘‘those facts
of the world that are matters of brute physics and biology’’ and the latter to ‘‘those
features of the world that are matters of culture and society’’; Searle points out that
‘‘[b]rute facts exist independently of any human institutions; institutional facts can
exist only within human institutions’’ [24, p. 27]. The categorisation above differs
from Searle’s in that category (b) only includes facts that owe their existence to the
law; facts arising from other areas of culture and society, i.e. institutional facts of an
extralegal origin, are classed in category (a) together with Searle’s ‘‘brute facts’’.
An example of a definite description denoting a fact that does not owe its
existence to the law can be found in Article 50, Paragraph 3, of the Constitution of
the Swiss Confederation:
(4) [Der Bund] nimmt dabei Ru¨cksicht auf die besondere Situation […] der
Berggebiete.
‘In doing so, [the Confederation] takes account of the special position of […]
the mountain regions.’
In the above sentence, the usage of the definite description the mountain regions
presupposes that there are mountain regions within the territory of the Swiss
Confederation. However, the existence of these regions does not depend on the
provisions of the constitution but rather predates this document: it is part of what has
been referred to as the extralegal, factive elements of Switzerland’s constitution [30,
p. 41]. This definite description thus has a purely referential function.
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The second type of definite description can be found, for instance, in the
provision of Article 174 of the Federal Constitution:
(5) Der Bundesrat ist die oberste leitende und vollziehende Beho¨rde des Bundes.
‘The Federal Council is the supreme governing and executive authority of the
Confederation.’
In this case, the presupposition has a constitutive function: the definite description
the Federal Council establishes that there is (or rather, that there shall be) an
institution of that name. Unlike the mountain regions discussed above, and contrary
to what a cursory reading of the above sentence might suggest, the institution of the
Federal Council does not precede the constitution, it rather only comes into being by
virtue of that very document. The presupposition triggered by the definite
description the Federal Council performs this constitutive act. It is curious that
such a consequential matter should only be expressed implicitly. Nevertheless, the
Swiss Federal Constitution, along with many other constitutions, establishes all
branches of government and the respective institutions by means of presupposition-
triggering definite descriptions (cf. Art. 148, Para. 1, for the legislature and Art. 188,
Para. 1, for the judiciary).
However, some constitutions have chosen a different approach: rather than
merely presupposing the establishment of such institutions, they make the
constitutive act explicit. Consider, for instance, Article II, Sect. 1, Clause 1, of
the Constitution of the United States, whose content corresponds to that of the
aforementioned Article 174 of the Swiss Federal Constitution:
(6) The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.
In contrast to the Swiss Federal Constitution, the U.S. Constitution does not merely
imply the establishment of the executive; rather, it explicitly introduces the
institution of the President of the United States into its discourse by means of an
indefinite noun phrase. The Constitution of Ireland expresses the act of establishing
the office of a president even more explicitly (Art. 12.1):
(7) There shall be a President of Ireland (Uachtara´n na hE´ireann), hereinafter
called the President, who shall take precedence over all other persons in the
State and who shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred
on the President by this Constitution and by law.
In summary, while the Swiss Federal Constitution merely presupposes that there is
(or shall be) a Federal Council, the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of Ireland
positively assert that there shall be a President of the United States and a President
of Ireland, respectively.
Historically, the explicit form of establishing institutions seems to have been
more prevalent. While the current Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999 establishes
the Federal Council by means of presupposition, its predecessors of 1848 and 1874
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(Article 83 and 95, respectively), like the U.S. Constitution, used an indefinite noun
phrase to this aim:
(8) Die oberste vollziehende und leitende Beho¨rde der Eidgenossenschaft ist ein
Bundesrat, welcher aus sieben Mitgliedern besteht.
‘The supreme governing and executive authority is a Federal Council, which
consists of seven members.’
A similar shift from an explicit to an implicit establishment of institutions can be
observed in the Anglosphere, where the form chosen to express constitutive acts
seems to coincide with the use or abandonment of the modal verb shall:
constitutions that retain shall, such as the Constitution of Australia, also tend to
make constitutive acts explicit, while constitutions that have abandoned the use of
shall, such as the Constitution of South Africa, usually resort to presupposition
instead.5
The use of a presupposition can be associated with several possible reasons. A
first reason for the use of a presupposition may be found where the respective
institution is not actually established by the constitution but rather considered to be
supra-constitutional. This may be observed in the preamble of the Constitution of
Australia, which refers to ‘‘the Queen’’ and states that ‘‘[t]he provisions of this Act
referring to the Queen shall extend to Her Majesty’s heirs and successors in the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom.’’6 As the Constitution of Australia is in fact an
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster, the Queen, even as
she becomes the head of state of the entity created by that constitution, appears as a
super-constitutional institution in the text.
A second reason for the use of a presupposition may be the fact that, in reality,
the institution to be established by the constitution already exists. Even though the
respective institution would cease to exist were it not for its mentioning in the new
constitution, the use of a presupposition conveys a notion of constitutional
continuity. The Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999 did not alter the basic make-up
of the Confederation, it was rather considered a update (‘‘Nachfu¨hrung’’) that
codified what had become constitutional convention since the passage of its
predecessor and did away with clauses that had since become obsolete [18]. The fact
that it introduces the institutions of the Confederation by means of presupposition
reflects this notion of constitutional continuity. In contrast, the Swiss Federal
Constitution of 1848, as well as the constitutions of Australia, Ireland and the
United States, marked the birth of stately entities that had not existed before and
could thus not adopt any institutions from predecessor states.
A third reason for the use of a presupposition may be found in the idea that the
establishment of certain institutions appears to be self-evident, that in fact these
institutions do not fully owe their existence to the text of the constitution but
somehow pre-exist in the sphere of natural law. This may explain why the Swiss
Federal Constitution of 1948, while introducing the executive and the judiciary by
5 For a general discussion of the use of shall in English-language legislative texts, cf. [31].
6 The definite description the Queen here refers to Queen Victoria (reign 1837–1901).
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means of indefinite noun phrases, uses a presupposition when it declares the Federal
Assembly to be the Confederation’s supreme authority (Art. 60). The fact that any
confederation, at its heart, has an assembly of the confederates must have appeared
self-evident. Linguistically, the use of the definite article may thus merely mark the
presence of a bridging reference (or meronym) to the already-established entity of
the Confederation. 7
Lastly, the use of a presupposition may simply be a matter of constitutional
tradition, i.e. an element of style that marks a text as a constitution in the respective
language.
Both forms of constitutive acts, the explicit and the implicit, can be preceded by
cataphoric references within the same text. For instance, even though formally the
office of the President of the United States is only constituted in Article II, Sect. 1,
Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution, it is already referred to earlier in the text, viz. in
Article I, Sect. 3, Clause 6:
(9) The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: […].
Similarly, while the Swiss Federal Council is only constituted in Article 174 of the
Swiss Federal Constitution, it is first mentioned—and its existence thus presup-
posed—in Article 84, Paragraph 2:
(10) Der alpenquerende Gu¨tertransitverkehr von Grenze zu Grenze erfolgt auf der
Schiene. Der Bundesrat trifft die notwendigen Massnahmen. […]
‘Transalpine goods traffic from border to border is to be carried out by rail.
The Federal Council takes the measures required. […]’
However, these instances of definite descriptions do not have the power to forestall
the constitutive act occurring later in the text; they merely represent cataphoric
references to the entity established by that latter act. Otherwise, the use of the
indefinite article a in Article I, Sect. 1, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution would not
make sense.
In some contexts, presuppositions triggered by definite descriptions create new
obligations. Consider the following excerpt from the draft of a bill intended to alter
the Swiss railway legislation (cf. [9, pp. 275 f.]):
(11) Die Weiterentwicklung der Bahninfrastruktur erfolgt im Rahmen des
Entwicklungsprogramms des Bundes und gema¨ss folgenden Zielen: […].
‘The railway infrastructure is further developed within the framework of the
development programme of the Confederation and according to the following
goals: […].’
7 Moreover, the role of the newly-created Federal Assembly corresponded to the role that the Diet had in
the Old Swiss Confederacy. The use of a presupposition may thus also have been aimed at expressing an
element of constitutional continuity.
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The definite description the development programme of the Confederation
presupposes (a) that the Confederation has a programme for the further development
of its railway infrastructure and hence (b) that the Confederation has been assigned
the task of devising such a programme. As there was no other mention of said
programme in the remainder of the bill or elsewhere, this presupposition would
effectively have imposed a new obligation on the Confederation. (The wording was
eventually changed by the drafting committee of the federal administration and the
obligation made explicit; cf. discussion below.)
So far, we have thus identified three functions that presuppositions may fulfil in
legislative texts: (a) a referential function (referring to facts that exist independently
of the law), (b) a constitutive function (establishing legal institutions), and (c) a
deontic function (imposing obligations). A fourth function will be introduced in
Sect. 3.3.
The functions identified can guide legislative drafters in their decision of whether
a specific presupposition-inducing definite description is desirable. From the
perspective of legislative drafting, presuppositions of the referential type are mostly
unproblematic. An explicit assertion of the fact that there are mountain regions
within the territory of the Swiss Confederation, for instance, would merely state the
obvious and thus introduce a non-normative, declarative element into the respective
legislative text, which is something that is generally discouraged by legislative
drafting guidelines [4, p. 375].
If the entity referred to is not a matter of physics but an extralegal social or
cultural institution, the situation is somewhat less clear. Social institutions are more
volatile than other extralegal entities and may easily perish without the law having
any say in it. Norms presupposing the existence of specific private organisations
thus run the risk of becoming obsolete once the organisation to which they refer
dissolves. Moreover, there may even be some cases where it is unclear whether the
respective norm places an obligation on the state to step in and establish a respective
body if private initiative fails. As an example, consider the following provision,
which appears in the first draft of a new Federal Act on Swiss Persons and
Institutions Abroad:8
(12) Der Bund pflegt Kontakte zu Institutionen, welche die Beziehungen der
Auslandschweizerinnen und -schweizer unter sich und zur Schweiz fo¨rdern
und zu einer besseren Betreuung und Vernetzung der Auslandschweizerinnen
und -schweizer beitragen, namentlich zur Auslandschweizer-Organisation.
‘The Confederation cultivates contacts with institutions that promote the
relations of the Swiss abroad among each other and to Switzerland and that
contribute to an improved support and interconnectedness of the Swiss
abroad, specifically with the Organisation of the Swiss Abroad.’
This provision presupposes the existence of the Organisation of the Swiss Abroad
(ASO), a private organisation aimed at representing the interests of Swiss citizens
8 http://www.parlament.ch[Dokumentation[Berichte[Vernehmlassungen[11.446—Pa.Iv. Fu¨r ein
Auslandschweizergesetz (last visited on 22/10/2013).
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living abroad. Moreover, the provision presupposes that this organisation promotes
‘‘the relations of the Swiss abroad among each other and to Switzerland’’ and that it
contributes ‘‘to an improved support and interconnectedness of the Swiss abroad.’’
The problem with such a provision is (a) that it becomes obsolete once the
mentioned organisation dissolves, (b) that it is unclear if it still applies if the
organisation were to alter its goals, and (c) that one may try to infer from it that
there must in fact be an organisation promoting the listed issues. If one assumes
with Marmor that presuppositions are part of ‘‘what the law prescribes’’ [16, p. 451;
cf. section 1], one could in fact conclude that the law, in this case, prescribes that
there must be such an organisation. Under specific circumstances, the use of a
presupposition to refer to an extralegal institution may thus cause certain problems
and uncertainties.
In contrast, whether legal institutions shall be constituted by means of
presupposition mainly seems to depend on the linguistic conventions present in
the respective legislative tradition and on the wish to express a notion of
constitutional continuity. As long as the presupposition is accompanied by norms
detailing the composition and powers of the institution and the procedures
associated with it, little harm is done by establishing it in an implicit way;
conversely, a lack of such specifications could not be remedied even if the
institution was established in a more explicit way.
The most problematic type of presupposition-inducing definite descriptions are
the ones that are deontic. They may obfuscate the duties and obligations imposed on
the subjects of a law. The drafting committee of the Swiss federal administration9
found, for instance, that this was the case with the statement cited in (11) above. The
committee pointed out that the presupposition triggered by the definite description
the development programme of the Confederation did not make it sufficiently
transparent that the Confederation was in fact required to draw up a development
programme for its railway infrastructure. It proposed an alternative wording in
which the obligation was asserted explicitly:
(13) Die Weiterentwicklung der Bahninfrastruktur hat folgende Ziele: […]. Der
Bundesrat unterbreitet der Bundesversammlung in regelma¨ssigen Absta¨nden
Programme zur Weiterentwicklung der Bahninfrastruktur (Entwicklungspro-
gramme). In den Entwicklungsprogrammen zeigt er auf, wie er die Ziele
erreichen will […].
‘The further development of the railway infrastructure has the following
goals: […]. The Federal Council periodically submits programmes for the
further development of the railway infrastructure (development programmes)
to the Federal Assembly. In these development programmes, the Federal
Council outlines how it intends to accomplish the goals […].’
The lack of transparency that can result from this type of presupposition is not only
problematic because it obscures the obligations placed on the subjects of the law
(the situation would be even worse if the norm imposed duties not on a government
9 The role of the drafting committee of the Swiss federal administration has been discussed in [19].
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body but on ordinary citizens). It also obstructs the findability of the respective
provision, thus making the law less accessible, which in turn may impede an
efficient and effective implementation of the law and unnecessarily prolongate legal
proceedings.
3.2 Modal Adverbials
Adverbials expressing the manner in which something happens trigger the
presupposition that the respective matter happens in the first place (e.g. The
tortoise overtook the hare slowly presupposes The tortoise overtook the hare). The
most frequent form in which such adverbials occur in legislative texts is that of
adverbial phrases.
Consider Article 163 of the Swiss Federal Constitution:
(14) Art. 163 Form der Erlasse der Bundesversammlung
1 Die Bundesversammlung erla¨sst rechtsetztende Erlasse in der Form des
Bundesgesetzes oder der Verordnung.
2 Die u¨brigen Erlasse ergehen in der Form des Bundesbeschlusses; […].
‘Art. 163 Form of Federal Assembly enactments’
1 The Federal Assembly enacts provisions that establish binding legal rules in
the form of federal acts or ordinances.
2 Other enactments are issued in the form of federal decrees; […].’
Paragraph 1 states that the form in which the Federal Assembly enacts provisions
that establish binding legal rules is that of federal acts or ordinances. This statement
presupposes that the Federal Assembly enacts provisions that establish binding legal
rules, i.e. that the Federal Assembly is vested with legislative power.
The Federal Constitution at no point asserts explicitly that the legislative power is
vested in the Federal Assembly. Article 148, which introduces the Federal
Assembly as an institution, merely states that, subject to the rights of the People and
the Cantons, the Federal Assembly is the supreme authority of the Confederation.
Barring speculation on a possible entailment from the rather vague notion of
‘‘supreme authority’’, the legislative function of the Swiss parliament is thus
established solely by means of presupposition, viz. by the presupposition contained
in the first paragraph of Article 163 cited above (cf. [30, pp. 372 & 435]).
The dual nature of Article 163 as (a) a norm prescribing (by assertion) the forms
in which enactments must be issued and (b) a norm vesting (by presupposition)
certain powers in the Federal Assembly is reflected in its particular location within
the broader structure of the text: it is the first article of the section defining the
‘‘Powers’’ of the Federal Assembly. This location would be hard to justify if the
article was to be reduced to the content stated explicitly; it is only plausible if the
presupposition triggered by the adverbial phrase in Paragraph 1 is considered to be
the primary content.
In their dual nature, the sentences of Article 163 violate one of the most
frequently cited rules of legislative drafting, namely the one requiring that a single
sentence should not contain more than one statement or norm. For legislative
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editors, it is crucial to determine whether the presupposition introduced by a modal
adverbial has been expressed explicitly at any other place in the text. If this is not
the case, as in our example, such a presupposition will be the less desirable, the
more independent its content is from the content asserted explicitly. That is,
legislative editors will have to anticipate whether the norm that is only presupposed
is likely to play a role of its own, or whether it will only ever be relevant in
combination with the norm expressed in the carrier sentence. The norm presupposed
in Article 163, vesting the Federal Assembly with legislative power, will clearly be
referred to in contexts where the form that particular Federal Assembly enactments
must take is irrelevant; from the perspective of legislative drafting, it would thus
have deserved to be asserted explicitly in a statement of its own.
3.3 Focus Adverbials
In legislative texts, focus adverbials (e.g. only, exclusively, notably, in particular) serve the
purpose of restricting or expanding the range of cases to which a particular norm applies or
the legal consequences it has. They also act as presupposition triggers. Consider, for
instance, the provision contained in Article 191c of the Federal Constitution:
(15) Die richterlichen Beho¨rden sind in ihrer rechtsprechenden Ta¨tigkeit […] nur
dem Recht verpflichtet.
‘In the exercise of their judicial powers, the judicial authorities are […]
bound only by the law.’
This statement presupposes that, in the exercise of their judicial powers, the judicial
authorities are bound by the law, and it entails that they are not bound by anything
else: the former is preserved under negation (In the exercise of their judicial powers,
the judicial authorities are not only bound by the law), whereas the latter is not.
While the adverb only has a restrictive effect, expressions such as notably and in
particular lead to the expansion of a clause. The following sentence (Art. 129, Para.
2, Sent. 2, of the Federal Constitution) may serve as an example:
(16) Von der Harmonisierung ausgenommen bleiben insbesondere die Steuerta-
rife, die Steuersa¨tze und die Steuerfreibetra¨ge.
‘Tax scales, tax rates, and tax allowances, in particular, are excepted from
harmonisation.’ 10
The focus adverbial in particular presupposes that there may be items other than the
ones listed that are also excepted from nation-wide harmonisation. 11 This type of
10 Compare the wording in the authentic French version: ‘‘Les bare`mes, les taux et les montants exone´re´s
de l’impoˆt, notamment, ne sont pas soumis a` l’harmonisation fiscale.
11 In the present case, the negation test cannot be used to assess whether the implied content is a
presupposition: it is unclear how a sentence that contains the adverbial in particular is to be negated (cf.
Beaver and Guerts [3, p. 2435] on the related problem of negating sentences containing the adverb too).
However, the implied content can be shown to be a presupposition because it is preserved if the statement
is transformed into a question: Are tax scales, tax rates, and tax allowances in particular excepted from
harmonisation?
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presupposition is particularly frequent in Swiss constitutional and administrative
law. Its function is expansive, i.e. it serves as a means to open up a clause for further
options that the legislator does not wish to specify explicitly.
From the perspective of legislative drafting, the main advantage of the use of
focus adverbials like in particular to open up provisions is conciseness: only
presupposing that there may be further options takes less space than asserting the
same thing explicitly. The main disadvantage is the lack of specificity that comes
with such a presupposition: the provision cited in (16), for instance, does not only
leave it open what further exceptions from tax harmonisation there may be, it also
does not specify who is authorised to designate such further exceptions. In
individual cases, the use of a presupposition to open up a clause may thus lead to
legal uncertainty.
Such situations can be avoided if the clause is opened up by means of assertion,
as it has been done, for instance, in Article 168, Paragraph 2, of the Federal
Constitution:
(17) Art. 168 Wahlen
1 Die Bundesversammlung wa¨hlt die Mitglieder des Bundesrates, die
Bundeskanzlerin oder den Bundeskanzler, die Richterinnen und Richter des
Bundesgerichts sowie den General.
2 Das Gesetz kann die Bundesversammlung erma¨chtigen, weitere Wahlen
vorzunehmen oder zu besta¨tigen.
‘Art. 168 Appointments
1 The Federal Assembly elects the members of the Federal Council, the
Federal Chancellor, the judges of the Federal Supreme Court and the General.
2 Statute may authorise the Federal Assembly to make or confirm further
appointments.’
The first paragraph of this article contains a closed list of authorities whose
members are elected by the Federal Assembly. Adding the expression in particular
would have opened this list to further options. Here, however, a second paragraph
fulfils this function: Paragraph 2 states explicitly that further appointments may be
delegated to the Federal Assembly and that such a delegation must be provided by
statute. In this last point, it is thus more specific than the presupposition trigger in
particular would have been. When faced with the task of opening up a clause,
legislative drafters will thus have to weigh the conciseness gained by using a
presupposition against the additional specificity that can be obtained by adding an
explicit statement.
3.4 Assessment Verbs
Factive verbs (e.g. confirm, know, notice, realise) have been frequently listed as
typical presupposition triggers in narrative discourse (Nancy knows that it takes 8 h
to get to Rome presupposes It takes 8 h to get to Rome). In normative texts, they do
not play a significant role. However, the particular deontic nature of normative texts
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entails that assessment verbs (e.g. assess, check, evaluate, verify) come to function
as presupposition triggers in ways that resemble the way in which factive verbs
trigger presuppositions in narrative contexts. As an example, consider the following
sentence from a draft of the Swiss Ordinance on the Promotion of Research and
Innovation (cf. [9, p. 276]):
(18) Die KTI beurteilt, ob eine Forschungssta¨tte nicht kommerziell ausgerichtet
und ob sie beitragsberechtigt ist, nach folgenden Kriterien: […].
‘The CTI [Committee for Technology and Innovation] assesses whether a
research institution has a non-commercial orientation, and whether it is
eligible for grants, according to the following criteria: […].’
In the deontic context of normative texts, the requirement to assess whether some
condition is fulfilled presupposes that the respective condition needs to be fulfilled
in the first place. In the above example, the norm that the CTI is to assess whether
research institutions applying for grants have a non-commercial orientation
presupposes that, in order to be eligible for grants, research institutions need to
have a non-commercial orientation. In the cited version of the draft, this
requirement was effectively introduced by said presupposition; it had not been
expressed anywhere else. 12 Assessment verbs like the one above can thus trigger
presuppositions of the deontic type, i.e. presuppositions that impose additional
obligations on the subjects of the law.
From the perspective of legislative drafting, a sentence like the one in (18) may
turn out to be problematic because it hides a general principle (that only non-
commercial research institutions are eligible for grants) in a statement that details
procedural matters (that the eligibility of an institution is to be assessed by the CTI
and that in this process the specific criteria listed thereafter are to be applied).
General principles often have an impact on the application of other norms, which
have to be interpreted against the background of those principles. If they are hidden
in a procedural provision, they run the risk of being overlooked in the application of
the law. Legislative drafters will thus have to consider whether it would not be
better to express the two things in separate statements, maybe even placed in
different parts of the text: the general principle in a section on aims at the beginning
of the statute or ordinance, the procedural provision in a respective section further to
the back.
3.5 Temporal Clauses and Past Participles
A statement saying that an event B happened after an event A presupposes that
A happened too: for instance, the sentence After the company went bankrupt, all
12 Note that there is a second presupposition in sentence (18), triggered by the modal adverbial according
to the following criteria (cf. Sect. 3.2): the procedural provision that the eligibility of an institution needs
to be assessed by the CTI is in fact also merely presupposed rather than asserted. The sentence thus
contains the following three provisions: (a) that to be eligible for grants, research institutions must be non-
commercial, (b) that the eligibility of research institutions must be assessed by the CTI, and (c) that said
assessment must be made according to the criteria listed thereafter. Only (c) is asserted, (a) and (b) are
merely presupposed.
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employees were made redundant presupposes that the company went bankrupt. In
legislative texts, this type of presupposition can take on an additional deontic aspect
if the past event to which a provision refers itself only exists by virtue of the law
rather than independently of it. Consider Article 139, Paragraph 1, of the Swiss
Federal Constitution:
(19) 100000 Stimmberechtigte ko¨nnen innert 18 Monaten seit der amtlichen
Vero¨ffentlichung ihrer Initiative eine Teilrevision der Bundesverfassung
verlangen.
‘Any 100,000 persons eligible to vote may within 18 months after the official
publication of their initiative request a partial revision of the Federal
Constitution.’
In this sentence, the temporal clause after the official publication of their initiative
does not just introduce a temporal condition on the main clause but also introduces,
by means of presupposition, an additional obligation: the federal authorities must
publish the initiatives they receive (which, in turn, presupposes that initiatives must
be submitted to the authorities for official publication).
Past participles can have a similar effect as they also refer to events preceding the
event denoted by the main statement. The effect can be observed, for instance, in the
following provision from a draft bill aimed at amending the Swiss railway
legislation:
(20) Sie ko¨nnen entweder zusa¨tzliche Massnahmen oder alternative Massnahmen
finanzieren, wobei sich im zweiten Fall ihr Anteil auf die Differenz zwischen
der vom Bund beschlossenen und der von ihnen beantragten Massnahme
beschra¨nkt.
‘They can fund either additional measures or alternative measures; in the
latter case, their share is limited to the difference between the measure
designated by the Confederation and the measures applied for.’
By referring to the measures applied for, this norm presupposes that a formal
application is necessary for some measures to be considered. It thus creates an
indirect obligation: if only measures that one formally applied for are considered,
then the process of applying becomes a compulsory component of the described
process. The draft containing example (20) did not state the respective obligation
anywhere else in the text. It only established the obligation through the
presupposition introduced by the past participle in (20).
From the perspective of legislative drafting, the danger with presuppositions
triggered by temporal clauses and past participles is once more that they may
obfuscate certain obligations defined by the law and thus result in provisions that
lack transparency. If some steps of a procedure are hidden in the description of other
steps, it often means that the temporal order in which the individual steps are to be
taken is not reflected in the surface structure of the text. It may thus take extra time
and effort to reconstruct the exact procedure laid out in the law. With regard to the
provision cited in (20), the drafting committee of the federal administration
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consequently requested that the obligation hidden in the past participle applied for
be made explicit in a separate statement.
Transparency is reduced even more if the asserted step and the presupposed step
are aimed at different addressees. This is the case, for instance, in the provision cited
in (19): the content asserted by the main clause is aimed at the People, whereas the
step presupposed by the temporal clause is to be carried out by the authorities.
4 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper has shown that a broad range of linguistic
constructions can introduce presuppositions into legislative texts. As presupposi-
tions transport implicit content that, just like the content asserted explicitly, forms
part of what the law prescribes, it is vital that legislative drafters recognise and
assess them properly. They must weigh the main advantage of using presupposi-
tions, conciseness, against the main downside, reduced transparency.
The present study has argued that the details of such an assessment depend on the
function the presupposition fulfils in the text, i.e. whether it is (a) referential,
(b) constitutive, (c) deontic or (d) expansive. Each of the functions identified gives
rise to specific constraints along which legislative drafters can decide on the benefit
and detriment of using a presupposition. The key criterion for assessing referential
presuppositions is whether they refer to what Searle [24] calls a ‘‘brute fact’’ or to an
extralegal social institution. In the former case, the use of a presupposition is
unproblematic. In the latter case, the norm may be rendered obsolete once the social
institution to which it refers has been dissolved. In contrast, the use of
presuppositions for constitutive purposes mainly seems to be a matter of convention
and constitutional continuity. It can help keeping the texts concise and avoiding
stating the obvious. The most problematic type of presuppositions are those that
have a deontic effect, i.e. presuppositions that impose new obligations on the
subjects of the law. The more independent the presupposed content is from the
asserted content, the more imperative it is that it is expressed explicitly rather than
hidden as an implicit precondition. This is the case, in particular, if the presupposed
content and the asserted content do not have the same addressee. As a general rule,
all obligations must be made transparent. Finally, presuppositions triggered by focus
adverbials such as in particular, i.e. presuppositions with an expansive function, are
usually unproblematic. However, legislative drafters must be aware that such
presuppositions sometimes lack the specificity of a statement that explicitly opens
up a clause to further options. An explicit statement is to be preferred if this lack of
specificity can lead to legal uncertainty.
In summary, the present study shows that, if administered carefully, presuppo-
sitions can be a useful stylistic means to keep legislative texts free from unnecessary
clutter that merely elaborates on the obvious; however, it also suggests that, if
applied wrongly, presuppositions can camouflage the duties and obligations placed
on the subjects of a law and thus infringe on its accessibility and its efficient and
effective implementation.
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